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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
property in question had, up to the time of taking, been undeveloped by the
landowners due to an apparent lack of immediate funds. The city appraiser
had apparently used the value of the property in the lesser valued of the
two zones in reaching a figure for the parcel of land in question. There is
also evidence in the record to indicate that the appraiser's figure was partially
based upon the fact that the claimants herein had failed to develop the
property, and thus concluded that the property was worthless. The Appellate
Division affirmed an order of Special Term setting the value of the property
at $710,000.03 Claimant, on appeal, urged that there was some question as to
whether or not the judgment of the Appellate Division was supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and whether due consideration was given to the evidence
presented. Normally, where the opinion of an expert is supported by actual
sales, this will be considered as substantial evidence and accepted by the court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that where there was an indication that an
appraiser had failed to take into consideration the difference in value between
two separate zones and had not afforded the landowners the fair potential
value of their property because they had failed to exploit it fully, this value
as set must be rejected and a new determination made.
The rule in New York as to the diversion by the State of a highway
abutting on a piece of property was reviewed in Selig v. StatC.9 4 When the
highway fronting on the claimants' property was converted into the New York
State Thruway, and the Thruway was raised approximately eight feet, the
main stream of traffic was thereby diverted. The claimants' property was not
taken nor used for the construction, and the only claim herein was for the
loss of value as a result of the change of the grade in the highway. Further,
the claimant was not deprived of access or egress from the property, as access
roads were provided. The courts below allowed damages to the extent of
$40,000, basing the award on the diversion of traffic and the circuity of
access.05 The Court of Appeals held that the rule in New York had been and
shall continue to be, that to be compensable, damages must result from a change
in grade, and that damages resulting from the diversion of traffic and from
the circuity of access may not be recovered. 96
Bd.
TAXATION
STATUTE ASSESSING TRAILERS TO OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY UPHELD
The house trailer or mobile home has become more and more a part of
the American scene. The families residing in these homes have presented a
93. 9 A.D.2d 949, 195 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't 1959).
94. Supra note 89.
95. 12 A.D.2d 688, 207 N.Y.S.2d 886 (3d Dep't 1960).
96. See McKale v. State, 278 App. Div. 886, 104 N.Y.S.2d 981 (4th Dep't 1951).
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peculiar problem in that they demand community resources, such as fire and
police protection, education for their children in community schools, and use
of the highways, courts and governmental resources, while until quite recently
they maintained an immunity from any taxation, due to a traditional view of
these homes as personality.'
An attempt to classify the mobile home as realty was made in 1952 by
the Assessors of the Town of Vestal, but the assessment was held void by a
court 2 which recognized the problem, but felt that legislation was the proper
recourse to pursue.
The legislature responded in 1954 by declaring that the house trailer shall
be included in the terms "land," "real estate," and "real property."8 Although
repealed, the latter statute has been re-enacted in the present Real Property
Tax Law with only minor modifications.
4
The instant case, New York Mobile Homes Ass'n v. Steckel r is the first
test of the constitutionality of this statutory classification of the house trailer
- as realty. Appellants, a group of trailer park owners, sought a judgment de-
claring the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives them of
their property without due process of law. The Supreme Court, although dis-
missing the complaint on the basis that the appellants lacked standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statute, declared the latter to be consti-
tutional.6 The Appellate Division, which felt that appellants had the requisite
standing, reversed so much of the judgment below as dismissed the complaint,
while unanimously affirming the determination on the merits.
7
The present litigation arises under the 1954 statute (statute applicable at
the commencement of this action), which provided that the trailer or mobile
home "shall be assessed to the owners of the real property on which they
are located."8 The present statute directs the assessment against the land
itself,9 but as this Court points out, reading the old statute in conjunction with
Section 304 of the Real Property Law,'0 it is clear that the legislature intended
the original statute to be read as re-enacted.
1. See Memorandum of Senator Warren M. Anderson, N.Y. Legis. Ann. 1954, p, 306.
2. Stewart v. Carrington, 203 Misc. 543, 119 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 726, § 1:
In addition to their meaning as provided in subdivision six, the terms "land,"
"real estate," and "real property" ... include all the forms of housing.., commonly
called and hereafter referred to as "trailers"; except (1) transient trailers which
have been located within the boundaries of a tax district for less than sixty days
and (2) trailers which are for sale and which are not occupied.
4. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 102(12)(g).
5. 9 N.Y.2d 533, 215 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1961).
6. 12 Misc. 2d 761, 176 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
7, 11 A.D.2d 751, 201 N.Y.S.2d 595 (4th Dep't 1960).
8. Supra note 3.
9. Supra note 4.
10. Section 304 of the Real Property Law, which was formerly Tax Law, Section 9,
reads now virtually as it did then: "All assessments shall be against the real property
itself."
COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
Appellants argue on this appeal, that the classification itself is improper,
that the statute is ambiguous and unconstitutional, and that it is so indefinite
as to be incapable of equitable and proper enforcement.
The Court of Appeals upholds the statute in an opinion written by Judge
Froessel. As to the first contention of appellants, evidence introduced at the
trial supported a finding that the classification was reasonable and justified and
not merely an arbitrary or capricious use of the States' authority to tax. That
the state has a broad power to classify cannot be disputed. The United States
Supreme Court has said:
They [previously cited cases] illustrate the power of the legislature
of the State over the subjects of taxation and the range of discrimina-
tion which may be exercised in classifying those subjects when not
obviously exercised in a spirit of prejudice and favoritism.... Grant-
ing the power of classification, we must grant Government the right
to select the differences upon which the classification shall be based,
and they need not be great or conspicuous."
Without the statutory classification, it is conceded that the mobile home
would ordinarily be considered personality. But other decisions involving
what has ordinarily been considered personality have been upheld when a
taxing statute has altered their classification. In People ex rel. Holmes Elec.
Protective Co. v. Chambers switchboards, wiring and associated equipment,
though mobile and removable without damage to the structure, were held to be
realty by virtue of the taxing statute.'
2
Appellants attempt to distinguish the latter case on the basis that the
articles involved were attached to the freehold. Their distinction is not well
taken, for as the Court here points out, the trailer, which is connected to
water, sewage, gas, electric and telephone lines, has as much, if not more,
attachment to the land.
The substance of the appellants' contention that the statute is unconsti-
tutional involves an attack upon the propriety of levying the assessment
against the real property upon which the trailers, which are individually owned,
are located.
The Court notes first that this is by no means an unusual or novel situ-
ation as improvements made by a lessee for his own benefits invariably in-
crease the assessment against the real property owner, who then has the means
at his disposal, by way of increased rent, to place the burden where it right-
fully should fall, that is, on the lessee. A separate assessment may be made,
but there is no statutory requirement forcing the taxing authority to follow
the internal arrangement between lessor and lessee.13
11. Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 331 (1913).
12. 1 N.Y.2d 760, 152 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1956).
13. Doughty v. Loomis, 9 A.D.2d 574, 189 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8
N.Y.2d 722, 201 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1960).
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The Court finds little merit in the case of Hoeper v. Tax Comm.,' 4 which
is relied on by appellants. Factually, the case involved an income tax statute
which sought to tax a husband upon the combined total of his and his wife's
income. The Court observed that in the Hoeper case, the husband, "-unlike
the trailer park owner-would have no means of recouping the additional tax
resulting from the value of another's property.""5
As to the final contention regarding possible inequities in enforcement,
the Court answers simply that the problems presented are all hypothetical,
and the record discloses no material inequities at this point. If they should
develop, the appellants may then obtain relief. "One cannot invoke to defeat
a law an apprehension of what might be done under it and, which if done,
might not receive judicial approval."' 16
The judgment of the Appellate Division is thereby affirmed. To the
writer the case appears correctly decided. The statute is reasonable and
corrects a serious problem. It appears not only expedient but a necessity to
levy the tax and place the burden of its collection on those who most readily
and efficiently may accomplish this end.
P.C. B.
INCIDENTAL NoN-RELIGIous USE OF REAL PROPERTY INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT
TAX EXEMPTION
The New York Tax Law, Section 4 (6), provides that "the real property
of a corporation or association organized exclusively for . . . religious, bible,
tract, charitable . . . purposes . . . and used exclusively for carrying out
there upon one or more of such purposes . . ." shall be exempt from taxation.
(Emphasis added.) It appears to be within the constitutional powers of the
states to tax religious and charitable organizations; so any exemption which may
be granted is the result of a desire on the part of the states to foster and finan-
cially aid these institutions. 17 These exemptions are ingrained in our way of life,
being in force in every state.'
8
The question of what is considered to be a charitable application of prop-
erty in order to qualify for an exemption was raised in the recent case of
People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Haring'9 which involved
an 800 acre farm owned by the Jehovah's Witnesses. Approximately 95% of
the farm's produce was used to feed members of the sect who worked either
on the farm or at a headquarters and printing plant located in Brooklyn. Re-
ligious leaflets produced in Brooklyn and the 5% farm surplus not consumed
by the sect were sold for income. The tax assessor, on the theory that the sale
14. 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
15. Supra note 9 at 540, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
16. Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 56 (1916).
17. Van Alstyn, Tax Exenption of Church Property, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 461 (1959).
18. Id. at 462.
19. 8 N.Y.2d 350, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
